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Chapter 1
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An effective Cyber Early Warning System (CEWS) should pick up threat
activity at an early stage, with an emphasis on establishing hypotheses
and predictions as well as generating alerts on (unclassified) situations
based on preliminary indications. The design and implementation of
CEWSs involve numerous challenges, such as a generic set of indicators,
intelligence gathering, uncertainty reasoning, and information fusion.
This chapter begins with an understanding of the behaviours of intrud-
ers, and then related literature is followed by a Bayesian-based method-
ology. It also includes a carefully deployed empirical analysis. Finally,
the chapter concludes with a discussion on results, research challenges,
and necessary suggestions to move forward in this research line.
1. Introduction
Traditional security solutions such as firewalls cannot assure the data, ob-
jects and resources restricted to unauthorised subjects. Such defensive ap-
proaches are increasingly insufficient for modern-day attacks as threat ac-
tors circumvent perimeter-based defences with a creative, stealthy, targeted
and persistent manner that often goes undetected for significant periods.
These attacks are multistage. If we can detect them early and respond
quickly, then high impact cyber incidents can be avoided. An active ap-
proach for cyber defence is needed, which in turn needs to detect early
stages of threat activities to deploy effective responses. A CEWS should
1
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serve such a goal.
One definition for a CEWS is that it “aims at alerting unclassified but
potentially harmful system behaviour based on preliminary indications be-
fore possible damage occurs, and contribute to an integrated and aggregated
situation report” [1]. Although there can be many overlaps between a typ-
ical intrusion detection system (IDS) and a CEWS, a particular emphasis
for a CEWS is to establish hypotheses and predictions as well as to generate
advice on unclassified activity based on preliminary indications [1].
This chapter sets off by attempting to present a generic attack model
in Section 2. Section 3 presents an analytical approach building over prior
work to threat monitoring [2–5]. Section 4 delves into the dataset and
experimental setup used for this effort, and Section 5 describes the results
of the proposed method for a lightweight CEWS. Section 6 provides an
overview for related work. Section 7 concludes this chapter with some
thoughts on open challenges in this area.
2. Cyber attack lifecycle
Modern attacks are multistage and producing evidence at each stage of the
attack lifecycle. In principle, this evidence can be collected and analyse to
alarm the attack, but difficult in practice as discussed in 7. The typical
stages of a cyberattack lifecycle can be summarised as below.
Stage 1 Reconnaissance: The attacker conducts initial surveys on poten-
tial targets which can be either systems or people. Once the target
identified, she starts to search for more specific information such
as internet-facing services and individuals deciding which weapon
to use. It could be a zero-day exploit, social engineering, spear-
phishing, or even bribing an insider.
Stage 2 Initial compromise:: The attacker successfully executes mali-
cious code on one or more systems on the target. She bypasses the
perimeter defences and gains access to the internal network. It can
be through a compromised system or user account, and attackers
often use phishing for this purpose. Because exploiting user vulner-
ability is easier than exploiting software/hardware vulnerabilities.
Stage 3 Command & control: The attacker maintains continued control
over the compromised system by installing a persistent backdoor. It
could be via downloading additional utilities such as remote access
Trojan (RAT) on to the victim system.
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Stage 4 Escalate privileges: The attacker attempts to escalate privileges
to gain enhanced access to the target systems and data. It could be
via a technique like a pass the hash, keylogging, obtaining public
key infrastructure (PKI) certificates, leveraging privileges held by
an application, exploiting a vulnerable piece of software on the
victim node or using any other method.
Stage 5 Internal reconnaissance: The attacker gains a better under-
standing of the environment, security at place, asserts and the roles
and responsibilities of key subjects.
Stage 6 Lateral movement: The attacker compromises more systems
and user accounts by moving between systems by using the access
gained from previous stages. It could be accessing network shares,
using task schedulers, remote desktop clients or virtual network
computing. Since the attacker is often impersonating a legitimate
user, evidence of their existence can be hard to find at this stage.
Stage 7 Maintain presence: The attacker installs multiple remote access
entry points (e.g. malware back doors) and may have compromised
several internal systems and user accounts to ensure that continued
access to the environment. At this stage, she deeply understands
the target environment, and within a proximity to reach her target
at any time.
Stage 8 Complete mission: The attacker executes the final aspects of her
mission. It could be stealing intellectual property, financial data or
any other sensitive information, corrupting mission-critical systems
in the business or disrupting the entire operations of the target
business. Once the mission has completed, she might either leave
the environment (without leaving evidence) or maintain access for
returning in the future.
The notion of early for a CEWS can be explained using the above attack
lifecycle. Notice the final stage (stage 8), it is the stage where exfiltration,
corruption, and disruption happening. As a result, the cost to the business
rises exponentially at this stage if the attack is not defeated. Any system
that can alert the ongoing malicious attempt using preliminary indications
before it reaches the final stage (i.e. mission completion) can be considered
as a CEWS.
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2.1. Automated threat detection
Modern cyber attacks don’t just happen but evolve in a phased approach
that includes early stages of reconnaissance and planning. It can take too
long by humans to notice these activities, tipping the scales in favour of
the criminals who want to break into our systems. Automated CEWSs are
necessary as more devices rapidly get connected to the “Internet of Things”
(IoT), including cars and homes. Automation increases the scalability and
effectiveness of security monitoring. Due to the targeted nature, attack
vector varies from one entity to another. Hence signature-based pattern
matching techniques would not be useful in the detection of these attacks,
and more sophisticated techniques are required. As shown in Figure 1,
our ultimate goal is to employ cognitive technologies to “early detect”.
However, at this stage of the work, we propose a simple, but systematic
behaviour analytic model suitable for early detection.
Fig. 1.: Automated threat detection: attack sophistication vs detection
technique to employ
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3. Methodology (Resource efficient monitoring)
An incident occurs when an attack is carried out. Each incident area
(e.g. scanning, compromising, malicious code) produces different indica-
tors which spread out over time and space. Given the mean time to detect
(MTTD) of a modern attack is about 200 days, it is necessary to main-
tain a long history of what is happening in the environment. Most systems
cannot keep enough event data to track across extended time intervals due
to the storage overheads. As a result, the scarcity of attack data within
a short period allows the attacker to go undetected. On the other hand,
as contemporary enterprise networks scale up in size and speed, a huge
volume of traffic has a cost ramification for collection and processing. Re-
sources of network devices are comparatively expensive and scarce. Such
resources need to be utilised on their regular activities than utilising on
monitoring activities. Therefore, to be a practical automated solution,
the proposed system should be computationally inexpensive. We propose
continuous monitoring via node profiling and analysis as described in our
previous works [2–5]. It uses information fusion and evidence accumulation
in computing node profiles.
3.1. Computing node profiles
Node profiling is the method of evidence fusion across space and time by
updating node score dynamically based on changes in evidence. Profiling
computes a suspicion score sw for each node in the system during a smaller
time window w. That score is updated as time progresses to compute a
node score NW such that,
NW =
∑
sw (1)
, for a larger observation window W =
∑
w.
3.1.1. Computing sw
Evidence to compute sw can be collected from any relevant source of in-
formationa and convert them to descriptors (a.k.a features), say D =
{d1, d2, d3, ..., dn}, subject to the condition that chosen descriptors have
some sort of predictive power of the monitoring behaviour defined in the
hypothesis H.
ae.g. packet/flow information from L3 switches or outputs of signature based IDSs,
anomaly detection components, antivirals, file integrity checkers, SNMP-based network
monitoring systems or any other source
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H - the hypothesis that given nodeb is under attack, i.e. an attacker
has initiated at least the first step of the attack lifecycle (see Sec-
tion 2).
Then sw is defined as:
sw =
{
1 if Λ = ln L(H|D)L(¬H|D) > 0
0 otherwise
(2)
where L(.) denotes the likelihood. Λ expresses how many times more
likely the observed evidence in D are under one model (say H) than the
other (¬H). Various machine learning algorithms, either supervised or
unsupervised, can be employed to estimate Λ depending on the context
and data availability.
3.1.2. Computing Λ using Naive Bayes model
A key application of predictive analytics is to classify entities and events
based on a knowledge of their attributes. In this chapter, for the purpose
demonstration, we employ a Naive Bayes classifier with communication flow
attributes to compute Λ as follows.
Let D = [d1, . . . , dn] be a n-dimensional space, where n is the total
number of attributes (descriptors) chosen to describe a communication flow
in a computer network. Note that we assume remote attacks here and hence
victims node receiving malicious communication flows during the attack
lifecycle. Using the notation of conditional probability and well known
Bayes theorem,
P (H/D) =
∏n
k=1 P (dk/H) · P (H)
P (D)
(3)
P (¬H/D) =
∏n
k=1 P (dk/¬H) · P (¬H)
P (D)
(4)
Dividing equation (3) by (4) and taking logarithm,
ln
P (H/D)
P (¬H/D) = ln
P (H)
P (¬H) +
n∑
k=1
ln
P (dk/H)
P (dk/¬H) (5)
bdenoted by an IP address in this work
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Equation 5 is the well known “Log likelihood ratio”. P (H), P (dk/H)
are prior and likelihoods terms while P (H/D) is the posterior probability.
Taking ln L(H|D)L(¬H|D)
∼= ln P (H/D)P (¬H/D) ,
Λ = ln
P (H/D)
P (¬H/D) (6)
A key assumption in equations 3 and 4 is that the conditional probability
of each feature given the class is independent of all other features. This is
not the case in many practical problems, including ours. For example, the
conditional probability of network services (e.g. HTTP, FTP, SMTP, SSH,
DNS) and the port number in a communication flow are not independent
of each other. But in practice, even when the independence assumption
is violated and there are clear known relationships between attributes, it
works anyway. A good example of this is spam filtering in which features are
individual words in an email. In this case, certain word combinations tend
to show up consistently in spam - for example, “online”, “meds”, “viagra”
and “pharmacy”. So, their occurrences are not independent of each other.
But Naive Bayes based spam filters which assume mutual independence
of features works very well in filtering spams. This can be due to two
reasons. First, prediction in equation 5 depends only on the maximum, not
the value of the maximum. Hence Naive Bayes classifier gets it right even
if there are dependencies between features given that such dependencies
do not change which class has the maximum probability value. Though
there is no guarantee it can always happen, the second reason might be
such dependencies often cancel out across a large set of features. However,
the performance of Naive Bayes can degrade if the data contains highly
correlated features as they over-inflating their importance (i.e. voting for
twice in the model). Therefore it is better to evaluate the correlation of
attributes using a correlation matrix and remove those features that are
the most highly correlated, and test the performance before and after such
a change and stick with better results.
3.1.3. Pros and cons using Naive Bayes
There are pros and cons of using Naive Bayes in this problem. As men-
tioned above, due to the nature of the problem, the proposed system should
be computationally inexpensive and lightweight. Using Naive Bayes, cal-
culating the probabilities for each attribute is very fast, hence the system
can retrain quickly as the data changes because temporal drift is a major
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issue in Cybersecurity problems. Another advantage of Naive Bayes is its
Naive (independent) assumption can be exploited to speed up the execu-
tion of the algorithm. Attribute probabilities can be calculated in parallel
using different CPUs, machines or clusters in real-world applications. This
is useful as global networks scale-up in traffic, volume and speed. Naive
Bayes does not need a lot of training data to perform well. Because inter-
actions between attributes are not considered in model training, hence less
training data needed than some other popular algorithms (e.g. logistic re-
gression). However, Naive Bayes will not be reliable if there are significant
differences in the attribute distributions between training and test cases.
Zero observations problem is a special case of this. After such cases have
been identified the model should be updated.
3.1.4. Compute sw using unsupervised learning
This section discusses how to employ unsupervised learning, in particular
an autoencoder neural network model, in estimating sw. An autoencoder
neural network is an unsupervised learning algorithm. It applies back prop-
agation, setting the output values to be equal to inputs (i.e. Dˆ ≈ D), by
learning an approximation to the identity function in the model. Figure 2
depicts an autoencoder model.
Fig. 2.: An autoencoder model.
To compute suspicion score, sw is defined as:
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sw =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(di − dˆi)2 (7)
In other words, sw is the reconstructed mean squared error (MSE) of
the autoencoder model during a smaller time window w. As far as anyone
knows, the total number of malicious data is far less than the total number
of benign data in many real-world security problems. Hence, we can expect
that the model learns patterns in benign data than malicious data that
it can’t easily see. As a result, high reconstructed MSE (sw) values can
be expected for malicious observations, which can be used to distinguish
victim nodes from normal nodes.
Nevertheless, from the machine learning perspective, it is still important
to evaluate different algorithms to see which algorithm performs best in
terms of false alarms and computational cost in estimating Λ. However, it
is out of the scope of this work.
3.2. Analysis
We compute a node score for each node in the system as described above.
Aggregating suspicious scores over time helps to accumulate relatively weak
evidence for long periods. These accumulated terms can be used as a mea-
surement of the level of suspicion of a given node at any given time. If an
attacker activity pattern is sufficiently reflected by profiles then detecting
anomalous profiles would be sufficient to identify attackers. Hence, our
task is detecting anomalous profiles in a given set of node profiles. We use
a statistical method to detect anomalies subject to the assumption that
normal node profiles in a given set follow an unknown Gaussian distri-
bution. Testing of our hypothesis for any given time is a Bernoulli trial.
Accumulated Bernoulli trials make a Binomial distribution which can be
approximated by a Normal distribution. In practice, the setup where we
have the distribution would be very well a mixture of Gaussian.
For each profile score NW , its Z score is computed as:
z =
NW − µW
σW
(8)
Where µW and σW are mean and standard deviation of the dataset at time
window W . A test instance is declared to be anomalous if z ≥ T = k.
Note that the threshold T adjusts itself according to current state of a
network as µW and σW change. k can be setup to 1,2 or 3 using the
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68%-95%-99.7% rule of detecting outliers with Z-scores. For example, by
setting k equals to 2, Z-scores in 2-3 range can be considered as borderline
outliers. If the data (NW values) is skewed, it is recommended to apply a
transformation technique (e.g. power transformation or logarithms) first to
move the dataset back to the normal bell shape and then apply the outlier
detection technique.
Above simple outlier detection method subject to the masking and
swamping effects. Multiple outliers may influence the value of the test
statistic enough so that no points declared as outliers. On the other hand,
swamping can occur when there is no outlier (or an outlier with very slight
deviation). Therefore we complement the outcome of the above outlier de-
tection method with graphical methods. Graphics can often help identify
cases where masking or swamping may be an issue. Our analysis compares
each node’s activity changes to activity changes in its peer group. Look-
ing at one’s aberrant behaviour within similar peer groups (e.g. same user
types, subnet, departments, job roles) would give better results in terms of
false alarms than setting a universal baseline. Hence first classifying simi-
lar nodes into peer groups (e.g. web servers, file servers, clients), based on
behaviour related attributes/features, and then applying the monitoring
algorithm is recommended. Finding suitable classification algorithms for
this task is left as future work.
4. Experimental setup
4.1. Dataset description
A third party dataset consists of malicious and normal traffic is used in
this work. According to the authors [6], IXIA PerfectStormOne Toolc has
been used to generate synthetic contemporary attacks (see section 4.1.2)
within realistic modern normal activities. A 100GB of raw network traffic
has captured.
4.1.1. Initial features
Forty nine features are extracted and categorised into five groups [6]:
• Flow related features: these features include the flow-related at-
tributes between two nodes in a computer network such as source
chttps://www.ixiacom.com/products/ixnetwork
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and destination IP addresses, port numbers and the protocol type
(e.g. TCP, UDP)
• Basic features: attributes that represent protocols connections (e.g.
duration, source to destination bytes, time to live, packets loss,
service, bits per second, packet count)
• Content related features: encapsulates the TCP/IP layer related
attributes (e.g. TCP window advertisement value, TCP base se-
quence number, packet size)
• Time related features: contains the time related attributes (e.g.
jitter, start time, inter packet arrival time, round-trip time, time
between SYN and SYN ACK, time between SYN ACK and the
ACK)
• Additional generated features divided into two groups: general pur-
pose features (each feature has its own purpose) and connection
features (built from the flow of 100 record connections based on
the sequential order of the last time feature)
None of the above features is attack dependent and can be extracted from
any given traffic flow, and hence can be considered as a general-purpose
feature set for monitoring. Readers are invited to refer to [6] for more
details about data generation, features and attack types.
4.1.2. Attack types
In addition to the day to day normal activities, following attack types
have been produced in the dataset. Note that one or more activity types
described below can be presented at different stages of the attack lifecycle.
For example, Fuzzers and Exploit can be presented at either stage 1, 2, or 5
of the attack lifecycle. Ability to detect them will stop the attacker reaching
the final stage of the attack where exfiltration, corruption and disruption
happening, and hence can be considered as an early detection. However,
we will mostly focus on reconnaissance activities in this work as obviously,
it would be the first step of many network-based computer attacks.
• Fuzzers: an attack in which the attacker attempts to discover se-
curity loopholes in a program, operating system, or network by
feeding it with the massive inputting of random data to make it
crash.
• Analysis: a type of variety intrusions that penetrate the web ap-
plications via ports (e.g., port scans), emails (e.g., spam), and web
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scripts (e.g., HTML files).
• Backdoor: a technique of bypassing a normal authentication, se-
curing unauthorised remote access to a device, and locating the
entrance to plain text as it is struggling to continue unobserved.
• DoS: an intrusion which disrupts the computer resources via mem-
ory, to be extremely busy to prevent the authorised requests from
accessing a device.
• Exploit: a sequence of instructions that takes advantage of a glitch,
bug, or vulnerability to be caused by an unintentional or unsus-
pected behaviour on a host or network.
• Generic: a technique that establishes against every block cypher
using a hash function to collision without respect to the configura-
tion of the block-cypher.
• Reconnaissance: can be defined as a probe; an attack that gath-
ers information about a computer network to evade its security
controls.
• Shellcode: attacker penetrates slight piece of code starting from a
shell to control the compromised machine.
• Worm: an attack whereby the attacker replicates itself to spread
on other computers. Often, it uses a computer network to spread
itself, depending on the security failures on the target computer to
access it.
4.1.3. Exploring the dataset
To investigate if all the descriptors in the initial feature set have some sort
of predictive power of the monitoring behaviour, we plot boxplots for each
descriptor separately in malicious class as well as in benign class. Due to
the space constraints, Figure 3presents only twenty boxplots of them. As
shown in Figure 3, there is a certain group of features which have different
distributions in malicious class than benign class. These features have
the discriminating power and hence inform more in classification/anomaly
detection model. To reduce the computational cost features having the
same distributions in both classes can be removed from unless they have
any other form of information such as semantic information which is not
encoded in the data. Therefore feature selection and reduction is necessary
to remove unnecessary features (e.g. features not informed in the model
and highly correlated features) from the feature set.
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Fig. 3.: Distributions of each feature in two classes (A-attack, N-normal).
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4.2. Feature selection using empirical analysis
As mentioned above, due to the scarcity of resources on monitoring devices,
reduction to the computational cost is vital in our problem. Hence feature
selection and reduction play an important role. Features described in sec-
tion 4.1.1 were chosen as the initial feature set, and then a random forest
model [7] was built and tuned using R’s random forest package (version 4.6-
12) [8]. Then, for the feature trade-off analysis in section 5.2, top important
features are selected using the mean decrease Gini (see Figure 4).
Fig. 4.: Feature selection: using empirical analysis.
5. Experimental results
In this section, experimental results are presented. We use graphical forms
(e.g. Z-Score graphs) to present information. Visualisation helps to quickly
recognise patterns in data as well as spotting masking and swamping effects
mentioned above.
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5.1. Monitoring for reconnaissance
Reconnaissance is a type of intrusion activities that can occur at the
very early stages of the attack lifecycle. In an active reconnais-
sance, an intruder engages with the targeted system to gather infor-
mation about vulnerabilities. So, our proposed technique was inves-
tigated against reconnaissance activities in the dataset. As shown
in figure 5, proposed approach can detect all victims of recon-
naissance activities in the dataset. It includes ten IP addresses,
namely, 149.171.126.18, 149.171.126.17, 149.171.126.11, 149.171.126.12,
149.171.126.13, 149.171.126.15, 149.171.126.16, 149.171.126.19,
149.171.126.14 and 149.171.126.10 in the dataset. These IP addresses de-
noted by red dotted lines in figure 5. All other nodes (30 IP addresses) are
normal and denoted by black lines. As expected, they keep suspicious score
near zero as they are not targeted by any reconnaissance attempt during
the monitoring period.
Fig. 5.: Monitoring for all nodes (forty nodes in the subnet). Victims of
reconnaissance attempts are denoted by red dotted lines. All other nodes
denoted by black lines in the above graph keep suspicious score near zero.
In order to closely investigate how our algorithm increment profile scores
over the time, figure 6 visualises the profile scores of node 149.171.126.18
against time and event arrivals. In figure 6, data points with + sign denotes
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a reconnaissance attempt as it happens over the time from multiple source
IPs while all other points denote a normal activity. As obvious, reconnais-
sance always increments the suspicious score of a node in the graph.
Fig. 6.: Increasing the suspicious score: + sign denotes a reconnaissance
attempt as it happens over the time from multiple source IPs.
It should be noted that computing cumulative scores NW itself and then
presenting them as in figure 5 are not enough in detecting on going malicious
activities. Because there is no sense of a threshold in that representation.
Converting to Z-scores is required. In Z-score graphs in figure 7, nodes
corresponding to red dotted lines denote victims. We set threshold as T = 2
in this work and then victims nodes are near the T , and importantly there
is a clear visual separation between the set of normal nodes and anomalous
nodes. Hence it is possible to recognise victims using the proposed method.
5.2. Feature trade-off analysis
As contemporary enterprise networks scale up in size and speed, huge vol-
ume of traffic has a cost ramification for security monitoring. Therefore,
as mentioned in section 3, in order to be a practical automated CEWS
solution, proposed system should be computationally inexpensive. Feature
reduction play an important role in developing light weighted solutions,
which could be motivated as long as it preserves the required level of preci-
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Fig. 7.: Z-scores: compassion within the peer group. Red dotted lines
denote victim nodes.
sion. We will investigate how number of features affects on the performance
as follows.
First, the most 5 importance features (top 5) were selected as input fea-
tures (see section 4.2) to the proposed algorithm, and then training time,
testing time (per test case) and false alarm rates were recorded. With
regards to the false alarms, misclassification of flows were counted. The
same experiment was repeated nine times by keeping all parameters un-
changed, except number of features which were varied as top 5, top 10, top
15 and so on until top 45 as described above. Training and testing time
were calculated on a laptop with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6820HQ CPU @
2.70GHz and 8GB of RAM. Ubuntu 16.04 operating system was running
on the laptop.
Figure 8 presents the number of features vs training time. As shown
in figure 8, number of features is proportional to the model training time.
Lower the number of features selected the better for training time. Figure 9
presents the number of features vs testing time. Though there are slight
drops at points 15 and 40, the graph has a increasing trend in general for
test time. Figures 10 and 11 present false alarms rates against number of
features used in the model. As obvious from figures, increasing number of
features does not always reduce the false alarms. In fact, in this particular
September 5, 2018 17:54 ws-rv9x6 A pre-print of an article published in Data science for cyber security.
Security science and technology, 3. London: World Scientific, chapter
5, pages 95-126. The final authenticated version is available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1142/9781786345646005
output page 18
18 Harsha Kumara Kalutarage and Siraj Ahmed Shaikh
case, it will start to increase false negative rates if we increased the number
of features beyond 20. From the security point of view false negatives
are more critical than false positives though later would affect on user
convenience. As per this analysis, using top 10 importance features would
be the best combination in terms of computational cost and false alarms
rates.
Fig. 8.: Number of features vs training time.
5.3. Monitoring for other activities
As explained in section 4.1.2, ability to detect any intruded activities simu-
lated in the dataset will stop the attacker reaching final stage of the attack
where exfiltration, corruption and disruption happening, and hence can be
considered as an early detection. Therefore this section briefly investigates
ability to employ proposed method to detect other intruded activities in-
cluded in the dataset.
We use the entire dataset, without excluding any specific type of mali-
cious activities, to produce the cumulative and Z-sore graphs as mentioned
above. Figures 12 and 13 presents the cumulative and Z-score graphs re-
spectively. Red dotted lines denote the victim nodes of different attack
activities simulated in the dataset. Note that it includes the same victim
IPs mentioned in section 5.1. Readers should notice the changes to the
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Fig. 9.: Number of features vs testing time (per test case).
limits of cumulative scores in figure 12. Its value increases from 40 (in fig-
ure 5) to 1500 for one node. This has happened due to the contribution of
other activities to increment node score in addition to the reconnaissance.
While this helps to spot that node quickly, in the same time it influences
the values of test statistic of other nodes to suppress (see figure 13). How-
ever, in practice, this wont be a problem as soon as highly deviated victim
is spotted and stop, rest of nodes start to stand out as µW , σW and T
adjusts itself according to the current state of the network. Therefore the
higher the number of suspicious activities is the better for early detection
using proposed method.
6. Related literature
An extensive survey of collaborative intrusion detection proposals can be
found in [9]. Collaborative intrusion detection works aim at sharing, cor-
relating and cooperatively analysing sensor data collected from many or-
ganisations located in different geographical locations and hence producing
early warnings on ongoing malicious activities. An infrastructure and or-
ganisational framework for a situation awareness and early warning system
presented in [10]. eDare (Early Detection, Alert and Response system) [11]
and the Agent-based CEWS [12] are similar efforts. However information
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Fig. 10.: Number of features vs false positive rates.
exchange can be seen as a major barrier for CEWS’ advances. The Inter-
net motion sensor, a globally scoped Internet monitoring system, statisti-
cally analyses dark net traffic that needs to be interpreted by humans [13].
DShield internet storm centre collects firewall and IDS logs world wide and
incorporates human interpretation and action in order to generate predic-
tions and advice [9] while eCSIRT.net [14] comprises of a sensor network
which collects and correlates alerts for human inspection. DeepSight in-
telligence collects, analyses and delivers cyber-threat information through
a editable portal and datafeeds, enabling proactive defensive actions and
improved incident response [15]. Human analysis and data mining is incor-
porated in order to provide statistics. In the context of security, data and
information sharing is difficult between different organisations and nations
due to various reasons [16, 17].
Situational awareness is an essential part of an CEWS which includes
awareness of suspicious network related activities that can take place at
all levels in the TCP/IP stack [18]. Such activity can range from low-level
network sniffing to suspicious linguistic contents on social media. Various
network measurements and techniques (e.g. packet inter arrival times [19],
deep packet inspection [20], game theory [21]) have been employed. The
idea for a common operational picture (big picture) is presented [22, 23].
A systematic review of cyber situational awareness can be found in [18].
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Fig. 11.: Number of features vs false negative rates.
However instead of addressing the full complexity, above solutions concen-
trated on a particular issue of the problem and some solutions (e.g. deep
packet inspection) are neither feasible in practice nor suitable for real time
analysis yet.
Sensing in-progress attacks requires strategically placed sensors
throughout the cyberspace. Current sensor networks for CEWS have a
simple monolithic structure [24], where data is acquired at the network
edges and then transmitted over a dumb infrastructure to a central loca-
tion for analysis. This can cause various issues to the analysis due to many
reasons such as nonidentical measurements, nonidentical local detectors and
noisy channels [25]. High computational cost is another significant issue.
Hence computationally fast and accurate methodology to evaluate the er-
ror, detection, and false alarm probabilities in such networks is essential.
Optimal sensor placement strategies for CEWS is discussed in [26]. Authors
study correlation between attack patterns of different locations (national
and international) and explore how sensors should be located accordingly.
The design and analysis of sensor networks for detection applications has
received considerable attention during past decades [27].
In order to early warn, fusion of different network measurements from
different sources is essential. Fusion of cyber related information from
a variety of resources including commercial news, blogs, wikis, and so-
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Fig. 12.: Profile Scores: cumulative scores of all nodes in the network while
being a target of all possible malicious activities including reconnaissance.
Victims of malicious activities are denoted by red dotted lines.
cial media sources is proposed in [28]. Bayesian fusion for slow activity
monitoring [3, 29], high speed information fusion for real time situational
awareness [30], JDL data fusion model to computer networks [31], detect-
ing network data patterns [32], combining data from sensors using ontology
methods [33] and fuse security audit data with data from a psychological
model [34] are few of them to mention. Using web-based text as a source
for identifying emerging and ongoing attacks can be found in [35].
An open, adaptable, and extensible visual analytic framework is pro-
vided in [36]. All data is treated as streaming and visualises them using
machine learning techniques [37], live network situational awareness sys-
tem that relies upon streaming algorithms included [38], fast calculations
of important statistical properties of high speed and high volume data [38],
sophisticated visualization of attack paths and automatic recommendations
for mitigation [39] are some interesting works.
Threat scenario provides an important aspect to the early warning dis-
cussion. For example, early warning on malware propagation can be easier
than warning on DOS attack. Focus to early warning on particular threat
type is common (e.g. [40–44]). A malware warning centre is proposed in [40]
while [42] aims for distributed and large-scale malware on the Internet. A
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Fig. 13.: Profile Scores: Z Scores of all nodes in the network while being a
target of all possible malicious activities including reconnaissance. Victims
of malicious activities are denoted by red dotted lines.
worm propagation stochastic model is built [43]. Authors propose a logi-
cal framework for a distributed early warning system against unknown and
fast-spreading worms. An open-source early warning system to estimate the
threat level and the malicious activities across the Internet is provided [44].
Limiting to a certain threat type is a major drawback of these proposals.
They cannot simply extend for newly emerging threats.
7. Research challenges
Traditional defences are simply not matching for today’s adversaries as
less than 1% of successful advanced threat attacks are spotted by SIEM-
systems [45]. Once pass through the perimeter defences, the attacker can
persist for long periods by moving laterally across the network and compro-
mising as many systems as possible. Using seemingly legitimate actions, the
attacker can then exfiltrate sensitive data or intellectual property. Hence
continues monitoring of the behaviour of systems/users is required. Unlike
most traditional solutions which focus on one or two steps in the attack life-
cycle, as shown in this work, our proposed method can counter adversary’s
activities at early stages of the attack lifecycle. As a result, by analysing the
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data and following the digital footprints of the attacker, a security profes-
sional can focus on disrupting the adversary’s attack before she can achieve
her goal.
Ability to early-warn depends on three factors: attack progression rate
(e.g. a malware propagation vs denial of service (DOS) attack), amount of
evidence produced at each stage, and the ability to acquire such evidence
by sensors. Rest of the section highlights a few challenges associated with
these factors.
7.1. Generic set of indicators
In other domains, such as natural disasters (e.g. tsunami), early warn-
ings are well established, and arguably simple when compared to the early
warnings on the cyberspace. For example, in kinetic warfare, intelligence of-
ficers study different sources of intelligence (e.g. listen to communications,
satellite imagery) to looking for known preliminary indicators of military
mobilisation. In medical diagnosis, preliminary indicators such as feeling
thirsty, tired, losing weight and blurred vision can early warn an individual
about diabetes. But on the cyberspace, it is not clear what these indica-
tors are or how they can be observed [46]. This presents a huge problem
when trying to develop CEWS. As some scholars argue [46, 47], CEWS can-
not be developed from a purely technical perspective. They must consider
more than just technical indicators and require significant input from other
disciplines such as international relations and sociology since the focus of
CEWS should be to warn of an impending attack rather than detecting
when it in progress. However the biggest challenge, a generic set of indi-
cators (signs) of preparation for an attack on the cyberspace is not well
established (understood) yet [48].
7.2. Gathering evidence
The cyberspace has a diversity. For example, it consists of different topo-
logical structures (e.g. PAN, LAN, MAN, WAN), different kind of networks
(e.g. open Internet, darknet, honeynet, demilitarized zone) and different
types of users (e.g. universities, health care system, the traffic system,
power supply, trade, military networks). These entities produce events in
different types and rates and have different analysis objectives and privacy
requirements. To provide a representative image of the cyberspace at any
given time, CEWS have to collect and process data from a range of these
different entities. Employing a large monolithic sensor network for intel-
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ligence gathering on the cyberspace would not be possible due to these
variations.
7.3. Uncertainty reasoning
The cyberspace is an uncertain place. Hence cyber defenders have to deal
with a great deal of uncertainty [3, 49] which is compounded by the na-
ture of computing. Any future CEWS that seeks to model and reasoning
on the cyberspace has to accept this ground truth and must deal with in-
completeness (compensate for lack of knowledge), inconsistencies (resolve
ambiguities and contradictions) and change (update the knowledge base
over time). For example, entering misspelled password can be a simple
mistake by an innocent user or a password guessing attempt by an at-
tacker. Cyber defenders do not know who the attackers nor their location.
Some suspicious events, e.g. a major router failure could generate many
ICMP unreachable messages while some computer worms (e.g. CodeRed
and Nimda) generate the same in active probing process, can appear as part
of an attack as well as can originate from normal network activities. Other
contextual information should be utilised to narrow down the meaning of
such data [3].
7.4. Scalability
In principle, it is possible to log every activity on every device on the
cyberspace, but in practice, security analysts cannot process these logs due
to their vagueness as attack indicators as well as the sheer volume of data.
The biggest challenge is how to start from imprecise and limited knowledge
about attack possibilities, and quickly sift through a huge volume of data to
spot a small set of data that altogether makes the picture of attacks clear.
As volume and rate of traffic are rising, an inspection of every individual
event is not feasible. A data reduction is needed [3].
7.5. Information fusion
As mentioned earlier, CEWS cannot be developed from a purely technical
perspective. Given the huge number of possible data sources and an over-
whelming amount of data they generate, a data reduction method is essen-
tial to enable continuous security monitoring [50]. Future CEWS require
fusing as many data sources as possible. Though it is not an exhaustive
list, potential data sources for this task would be: network data traffic, log
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files, social media, mobile location traces, mobile call traffic, web browsing
traces, content popularity, user preferences, spatial/geographic distribu-
tion of network elements, network topology (router and AS level), network
paths, protocol traces, social network structure and other security intelli-
gence either system or social level.
7.6. Evaluation
Getting validity for a novel method is only possible through a proper eval-
uation. But in this research area, evaluation of novel algorithms against
real-time network data is a challenge. Real network traffic datasets with
ground truth data on attack activity are difficult to obtain. Any such ef-
fort faces the uncertainty of success in investigating relevant patterns of
activities. One solution to this problem would be to develop monitoring al-
gorithms based on unary classification as it is relatively easier to find clean
datasets than malicious ones, or providing mathematical proof for novel
methods.
Machine learning algorithms need to be verified to find out their precise
performance in real data. Specially in network computer security it is
really important to have good datasets, because the data in the networks is
infinite, changing, varied and with a high concept drift. These issues force
us to obtain good datasets to train, verify and test the algorithms.
7.7. Incident data integrity and retention
No matter how persuasive evidence may be, it can be thrown out of court
if you somehow alter it during the evidence collection process. Make sure
you can prove that you maintained the integrity of all evidence. You may
not detect all incidents as they are happening. Sometimes an investigation
reveals that there were previous incidents that went undetected. It is dis-
couraging to follow a trail of evidence and find that a key log file that could
point back to an attacker has been purged. Carefully consider the fate of
log files or other possible evidence locations. A simple archiving policy can
help ensure that key evidence is available upon demand no matter how long
ago the incident occurred.
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